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THE GRAND JURY REPORT AS AN
INFRINGEMENT OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
"The law is good, if a man use it lawfully," Paul advised Tim-
othy.' This lofty epigram, of course, begs a very fundamental ques-
tion-namely, what is lawful? A topic on which this basic inquiry
has produced considerable debate is that of the grand jury2 report.
Does the grand jury have the right to issue a report and if so when
and about whom?
In Monroe v. Garrett,3 decided April 29, 1971, the court of ap-
peal reiterated California's position granting wide and extensive pow-
ers to the grand jury to issue public reports. The case arose after the
1968 Los Angeles county grand jury investigated disturbances on sev-
eral state college and high school campuses, with particular attention
to the part played by the Educational Opportunities Program (EOP)4
in the disturbances. As a result of its investigation, the grand jury re-
turned indictments against numerous individuals; many were subse-
quently convicted on various charges including conspiracy, false im-
prisonment, kidnapping, assault, disturbing the peace, malicious mis-
chief, and trespassing.r
While a number of those indicted were awaiting trial,6 the grand
jury issued a public report and a press release7 summarizing its find-
ings and making several recommendations. Included was the recom-
mendation that the EOP be closely examined to determine if persons,
otherwise qualified for program financial aid, had been required to
pledge themselves to engage in militant campus activities as a condition
1. 1 Timothy 1:8 (King James).
2. A grand jury is a group of citizens sworn to investigate crime within their
county. CAT. PEN. CODE § 888 (West 1970). There is a required number of 23 in
a county with a population exceeding four million persons (Los Angeles) and 19 in
other counties. Id. § 888.2; see CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 8, which provides that
"[a] grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county."
3. 17 Cal. App. 3d 280, 94 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1971).
4. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060-89 (1970). Section 1060 provides for denying finan-
cial aid for two years to persons engaging in unlawful or disruptive campus be-
havior. For a similar provision pertaining to state financial aid see CAL. EDuc. CODE
§ 31291 (West Supp. 1971).
5. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 282, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 532. But cf. Castro v. Superior Ct.,
9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970).
6. Plaintiff's Petition for Hearing at 6, 8.
7. The press release was issued nearly two weeks before the grand jury's final
report. Respondent's Brief at 1.
precedent to qualifying for aid under the program.8 The grand jury
also recommended that faculty members or students indicted for a fel-
ony "based upon criminal activity occurring at or adjacent to an educa-
tional facility" be suspended until after the criminal charges had been
resolved.9
The propriety of a grand jury report is normally challenged by an
action for libel or slander, 10 or by a motion to have the report ex-
8. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 282, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
9. Id. The court reprinted the following portion of the press release which
had been objected to by the plaintiff in an appendix to the opinion:
"' Let there be no mistake about the fact that meaningful changes resulting in im-
proved levels of social, educational and economic attainment for citizens of all social,
ethnic and cultural backgrounds stands highest on any list of priorities, and the need
for such progress has been of particular concern to the members of this Grand Jury.
We realize, however, that there are individuals who engage in both overt and covert
activity in the area of civil strife whose motives and purposes should be subject to
careful evaluation and scrutiny ...
[W]e therefore: . . .
(3) recommend that the Educational Opportunities Program, which permits dis-
advantaged persons to receive a college education, be closely examined to determine if
qualified persons are being required by any persons or organizations to commit them-
selves to engage in militant campus activities as a condition precedent to acceptance
into such college program. We are inclined to believe that the recruitment and admis-
sion procedures currently utilized by various local colleges participating in the Educa-
tional Opportunities Program are in vital need of revision in order that the opportunities
existing under such program be afforded those whose primary objective is obtaining a
college education.
"The 1968 Grand Jury is of the opinion that it is inimical to the interest of an
academic community to permit a person charged with a felony offense arising out of
acts of civil disobedience which occurred at or adjacent to an educational institution,
to continue as a faculty member or student while such charges are still pending.
"We, therefore, recommend that after a faculty or student member has either been
bound over for trial in the Superior Court after a preliminary hearing, or is indicted
for a felony offense based upon criminal activity occurring at or adjacent to an edu-
cational facility, such faculty member or student be immediately suspended by an
appropriate administrative head of such facility until the criminal charges have been
resolved either by trial, plea or dismissal.'" Id. at 285, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
10. The only California case in which a grand jury report was challenged by a
libel and slander action is Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933).
For decisions in other states see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 716, 718-21 (1956); Annot.,
42 A.L.R.2d 825, 826-30 (1955). The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 589 (1938) pro-
vides: "A member of a grand or petit jury is absolutely privileged to publish false and
defamatory matter of another in the performance of his function as a juror, if the
defamatory matter has some relation to the proceedings in which he is acting as a
juror." Comment c to that section provides: "[G]rand juries are generally authorized
by law to . . . make charges by indictment. If the grand jury is authorized to conduct
investigations [into crime] and to make reports thereof, the members are protected for
any defamatory publication included as a part of such a report to the proper officer"
(emphasis added.) See also Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
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punged from the court's records. However, the plaintiff in Monroe
was the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) in southern California, and was not named or referred to in
the report. He sued in a representative capacity and brought a class
action on behalf of all taxpayers in Los Angeles County for reimburse-
ment by the grand jury of the amounts spent in issuing the allegedly im-
proper report and press release.'1 A summary judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff requiring the defendants, as members of the grand
jury, to reimburse the county of Los Angeles a total of six cents.
12
Before the court of appeal, the primary issue presented was
whether the making of the above recommendations in the report and the
press release was within the jurisdiction and scope of authority of the
grand jury.'3 A unanimous court of appeal reversed the decision of
the trial court and held that the grand jury had acted lawfully and
within the scope of their powers in issuing the report and press release,
and in making "peripheral recommendations aimed at preventing simi-
lar crimes."' 4
This note will review certain of the policy arguments both for and
against grand jury reports.' 5 The policy arguments favoring reports
11. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 281-82, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32. The plaintiff did not
challenge the general authority of the grand jury to issue a report, but instead chal-
lenged the particular type of recommendations the Los Angeles grand jury had made.
"Plaintiff does not question the right of the defendants to make inquiry into whether
any crimes were committed within the county and to make report of such investiga-
tion. He does challenge the right of the defendants as a grand jury, to thrust itself
into non-criminal matters clearly outside its jurisdiction. At stake here is the right of
the defendants, as a grand jury, to expend public funds to advise educators who shall
be students at their institutions and who should be the beneficiaries of a national edu-
cational program. . . . Such conduct by the grand jury has nothing to do with the
prevention or reduction of crime and violence in the County." Respondent's Brief at
7-8. In particular, the plaintiff challenged the grand jury's right to make its recom-
mendations in the form of a press release. Id. at 16-22. New York has established
that a grand jury has no such right. In re Jan. 1967 Reports of the Grand Jury, 52
Misc. 2d 895, 896, 277 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1967): 'There is no authority nor
is it proper for the members of a grand jury to issue a press release or any other an-
nouncement expressing their personal views and recommendations on any subject .. "
Cf. Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1962) (trustees of a
school district not permitted to announce to the general public that a student was
involved in a "violation of manners, morals and discipline").
12. Six cents was the amount of damages requested by plaintiff; this was the
amount "awarded Henry Ford in his libel action against the Chicago Tribune, another
case involving a 'principle'." Respondent's Brief at 4-5.
13. Also at issue was whether the grand jury was liable for the money spent to
make recommendations in the report and press release. The court's determination that
the recommendations in the report and press release were proper obviated considera-
tion of this issue. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
14. Id. at 284, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
15. See text accompanying notes 53-67 infra.
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-for example, the public's right to know of noncriminal, antisocial
conduct-are more persuasive where the individual affected is a public
official rather than a private individual, yet the Monroe decision indi-
cates a continuation of California's broadly permissive policy of allow-
ing grand jury reports regardless of the status of the individual affected.
Adherence to this policy would seem to require legislation designed to
clearly define the permissible limits of a grand jury report.
The note will also review recent state and federal legislation1"
which has dealt with this problem, and will recommend that considera-
tion be given to the approach taken in these statutes as a workable
model for statutory safeguards needed in California. 7 These statutes
generally permit the grand jury to report on noncriminal official mis-
conduct by public officials or employees while assuring such individuals
procedural safeguards against many abuses of discretion by the grand
jury. These statutory safeguards strike a balance between the public's
right to know and considerations of fairness to the individual about
whom the grand jury issues its report. One of these safeguards-de-
layed publication of a report when the individual named in the report
faces criminal charges-deserves special consideration because it is
based not only on notions of fairness, but would appear to be required
under the constitutional guarantees of a right to a fair trial. 18  A grand
jury report released while criminal charges are pending against the one
named or implicated by such a report may influence jurors and thereby
impair the right of the accused to a fair trial. Where even the possi-
bility of prejudice exists, the veil of secrecy 9 which hides grand jury
proceedings from public view should not be lifted until completion of
the criminal proceedings, or until after the danger of prejudice has
passed.
The Grand Jury Report
A grand jury report should be carefully distinguished from either
16. See text accompanying notes 68-79 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 80-87 infra.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed ...... See also id. art. III, § 3,
amends. V, XIV.
19. The California Penal Code contains a number of sections pertaining to the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and deliberations including sections 911, 915, 924,
924.1, 924.2, 937, 938, 938.1, 939 and 939.1.
However, although they are generally conducted in secret, grand jury hearings
may be opened to the public where the "general public welfare" is affected. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 939.1 (West 1970). For example, when misconduct or corruption of public
officials is being considered. Samish v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 83 P.2d
305 (1938). See also Comment, The California Grand Jury-Two Current Problems,
52 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 120-21 (1964).
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an indictment 0 or a presentment 2' because the report does not charge
the commission of any crime. Rather, it is a publication by the grand
jury in its official investigative capacity, disclosing its findings on mat-
ters purportedly of public concern. Some of the reports also include
recommendations by the grand jury on how to alleviate the problems
discussed in the report. In California, the grand jury is expressly au-
thorized under the Penal Code to issue public reports which deal with
county administrative matters.22 For example, the grand jury is au-
thorized to examine and report on the accounts and records of county
officers,23 to report annually to the board of supervisors on the need for
an increase or decrease in the salaries of the district attorney and audi-
tor,2 4 to report to the legislature as often as deemed necessary on the
need for increases in salaries of supervisors,25 and to examine and re-
port on the books, records and accounts of ex officio officers.2 6
The focus of this note, however, is on reports which lack express
statutory authority. Commonly, these reports take one of two forms.
First, there is the general type of report which discusses undesirable
conditions in the community without naming specific individuals. Sec-
20. "An indictment is an accusation in writing, presented by the grand jury to a
competent court, charging a person with a public offense." CAL. PEN. CODE § 889
(West 1970). The customary procedure is for the prosecutor, generally the district
attorney, to submit to the grand jury a formal, written accusation or "bill of indict-
ment" The grand jury must then determine from the evidence presented by the
prosecutor whether the accusation, if proven, would be sufficient to secure conviction
of the accused. id. § 939.8. If the required number of jurors find the bill to be a
"true bill", it becomes an indictment and the accused stands indicted. If the required
number of jurors find that the prosecutor hag not submitted sufficient information to
substantiate the bill of indictment, i.e., to make it a true bill, the grand jury is said to
ignore it.
The number of jurors required to return a true bill of indictment is 14 in a
county having 23 grand jurors and 12 in a county having 19 grand jurors. Id. § 940.
21. The terms presentment and report are often used interchangeably but such
usage is technically incorrect and adds little to a clear understanding of the function
of the grand jury. A presentment is an accusation of crime made by a grand jury at
its own instance and from its own knowledge after investigating and reviewing evi-
dence supplied by one or more of its members or other witnesses. See, e.g., id. § 918.
Very often in response to the presentment the prosecutor draws up a bill of in-
dictment and the grand jury then considers the bill as it would any other, endorsing
it as a true bill or ignoring it. A point which deserves emphasis is that both the
indictment and the presentment result in a written, formal accusation of crime de-
signed to initiate criminal prosecution. The grand jury report, on the other hand,
serves no such purpose.
22. Id. §§ 925, 927, 928, 929, 933.5; see also id. § 930.
23. Id. § 925.
24. Id. § 927.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 929. See also id. §§ 928, 930, 933.5; Board of Trustees v. Leach,
258 Cal. App. 2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1968); 46 Ors. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 144 (1965).
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ond, there is the specific report which publicly condemns specific in-
dividuals-frequently public officials-without necessarily returning
criminal indictments.
There is disagreement as to whether common law grand juries
had any power to issue informational reports,27 although there is some
evidence that the practice was at least tolerated.2 s Modem American
courts vary as to recognition of the propriety of the grand jury's report-
ing function. Many courts permit the general type of report even in
the absence of express statutory authority,29 although a few courts re-
fuse to recognize any power of the grand jury to issue reports except
when expressly granted by the legislature.30 The majority of American
courts which have considered the problem refuse to allow grand jury re-
ports which publicly criticize a specific individual without indicting
him.3 When an individual's reputation is at stake, these courts refuse
27. There is general but not complete agreement that common law grand juries
had the power to issue general reports. See, e.g., In re Camden County Grand Jury,
10 N.J. 23, 40-59, 89 A.2d 416, 426-39 (1952), in which Chief Justice Vanderbilt
discussed various grand jury reports in early New Jersey dealing with the failure to re-
pair a bridge, the failure to repair a road, the failure of a railroad to provide a flagman
at a grade crossing, poor administration of a water department, the inadequacy and
unhealthiness of a police station, morally infectious motion pictures, and numerous
other matters. -But see 7 MEDALIE, THE PANEL 5 (1929), cited in In re United Elec.
Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 869 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
There is more pronounced disagreement as to whether common law grand juries
had the power to issue specific reports. For authority that such power existed see In re
Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 623, 137 A. 370, 372-73 (1927); Poston v.
Washington, A. & Mt. V.R. Co., 36 App. D.C. 359, 367-69 (1911). Contra 1 S. WEBB
& B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1908); IV. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 144-48 (1924); X. id. 146-50; GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCE-
MENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 343-65 (1944); A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 70-71 (1930) cited in in re United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 863
n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow
or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1106-10 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Kuh].
28. See, e.g., In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 40-59, 89 A.2d 416,
426-39 (1952); Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41
YALE L.J. 687, 706 (1932).
29. See, e.g., In re United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1953): "We are not here concerned with reports of a general nature touching on con-
ditions in the community. They may serve a valuable function and may not be
amenable to challenge."
30. This is basically the approach taken by the court in Hammond v. Brown,
323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971); cf. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 444 (West
1967), which provides in part: "The grand jury is an accusatory body and not a censor
of public morals. It shall make no report or recommendation, other than to report its
action as aforesaid."
31. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 231 Ala. 503, 165 So. 582 (1936) (report
ordered expunged); In re Gulf County Grand Jury, 224 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1969) (ex-
pungement recognized as proper when report censures public official or other person
without indictment); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927)
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to overlook the lack of legislative authority for the specific report, and
such reports are commonly expunged from the court records.3 2 As one
court explained, this judicial stance is based on a policy that "a man
should not be subject to a quasi-official accusation of misconduct which
he cannot answer in an authoritative forum.
33
The following hypothetical will illustrate the various contexts in
which a grand jury report may be issued with differing consequences.
Suppose the grand jury of Blackacre County has made an investigation
of alleged corruption in the police force.34 If the grand jury finds in-
sufficient evidence to return criminal indictments, it may nevertheless
issue a general report to draw public attention to the corruption within
the police department.3 5 Since no named individual is singled out,
there is little danger to individual reputations; the police force as a
whole is placed under suspicion but this may be deemed justifiable be-
cause of the strong public interest in honest and efficient law enforce-
ment. But suppose that the grand jury in this report accuses named
policemen of misconduct, and instead of issuing a general report, the
grand jury issues a specific report. If the accusations amount to charges
of criminal conduct they are clearly improper since the individual has
not been indicted.36 However, the specific report may attribute cer-
(report expunged where it was calculated to injure reputation of individuals named or
inferentially included therein); Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200,
150 N.W. 141 (1914) (report expunged as improper where not followed by indictment);
State ex. rel. Strong v. District Court, 216 Min. 345, 12 N.W.2d 776 (1944) (report
expunged as improper and held not privileged); State v. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164
S.E. 873 (1932) (report expunged where individual censured without indictment);
In re Grand Jury Report, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931) (report expunged
where it criticized practice of city attorneys accepting retainers).
32. See, e.g., In re Camden County Grand Jury, 34 N.J. 378, 169 A.2d 465
(1961). "Mhe criticism of the individual is allowable only where it is integrally asso-
ciated with the main purpose of the report, i.e., to draw critical attention to some
undesirable condition in the affairs of the public [citation omitted]. The presentment
[report] cannot be used to single out persons in private or official positions and impugn
their motives, or by word or innuendo hold them to scorn or to censure." Id. at 391,
169 A.2d at 472.
33. In re United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
34. The grand jury should not engage in "fishing expeditions" and can investi-
gate only if the investigation grows out of legitimate inquiry into criminal or corrupt
activity. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 64 (1906); Samish v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal.
App. 2d 685, 688, 83 P.2d 305, 306 (1938); Kennedy & Briggs, Historical and Legal
Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 CALiF. L. REv. 251, 264 (1955);
see CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 917, 919, 923 (West 1970); cf. Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. 2d 607,
36 P.2d 614 (1934) (grand jury has no power to employ persons to investigate crime).
35. There is no express statutory authority in California for the grand jury to
issue this type of report.
36. See Monroe v. Garrett, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 283-84, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 533;
In re Gardiner, 31 Misc. 364, 367, 64 N.Y.S. 760, 762 (1900); Kuh, supra note 27, at
1129,
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tain misconduct to the named individuals which is not criminal in na-
ture. For example, the grand jury report may state that officers A and
B, the chief of police's direct subordinates, are grossly inefficient and
lax in their duties. Since A and B have not been indicted and hence
are unable to refute these charges with evidence at trial, it is important
that there be appropriate safeguards against either an improperly moti-
vated or negligently considered grand jury report.
On the other hand, suppose that the grand jury indicts A and B
for accepting bribes, and also issues a public report enlarging on the cir-
cumstances under which such indictments were returned. The report
may refer to A and B by name (specific) or it may make no direct refer-
ence to A and B, but instead may concentrate on exposing the corrup-
tion in the police force without mentioning any specific individuals. In
either case, the report may be issued prior to the indictment, at the time
of indictment,3 7 after the indictment but prior to trial, or after trial. In
all but the last instance, the grand jury report may expose A and B
to pretrial prejudice. Arguably the indictment itself may subject A and
B to prejudice, but the issuance of a special report in addition to the
indictment would add to the possibility of prejudice.
In Monroe v. Garrett the grand jury report was issued while crimi-
nal charges against a number of the accused were pending. The timing
of the issuance of the report, and the unmistakable reference to the de-
fendants in the report,"8 would certainly appear to have adversely af-
fected the defendant's right to a fair trial. The Monroe decision, how-
ever, approved the issuance of the report and indicates a continuation
of California's policy of allowing the grand jury great freedom in issuing
reports and making recommendations. This decision emphasizes the
need for legislation defining the permissible limits of grand jury re-
ports,3 9 and at the very minimum, indicates the need for legislation de-
signed to safeguard a criminal defendant's right to fair trial by forbid-
ding pretrial release of a potentially harmful grand jury report.4 °
The California View: From Irwin v. Murphy
to Monroe v. Garrett
The appellate court in Monroe relied heavily on section 917 of
the California Penal Code which provides that the "grand jury may
inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within the county
37. This was the situation in Monroe. Plaintiff's Petition for Hearing at 6.
38. Although the report itself did not "name names", the press accounts which
carried the grand jury's recommendations for suspending indicted students and faculty
did carry the names of those under indictment. Id. at 4-6.
39. See text accompanying notes 65-79 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 88-129 infra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
GRAND JURY REPORTS
and present them to the court by indictments."' 4' This code section
does not expressly authorize the issuance of a report either to the court
or to the public. At issue, then, was whether the express power to in-
vestigate impliedly gave the grand jury in Monroe the right to issue a
public report and disclose its findings by making a press release. In
reaching the conclusion that the grand jury had acted properly in issu-
ing the report and press release, the court stated:
The Grand Jury in the instant case was legitimately investigating
crime on campuses, and, during the course of that investigation, it
made peripheral recommendations aimed at preventing similar
crimes ...
In our system of government, a Grand Jury is the only agency
free from possible political or official bias that has an opportunity
to see the picture of crime and the operation of government relating
thereto on any broad basis. It performs a valuable public purpose
in presenting its conclusions drawn from that overview. The public
may, of course, ultimately conclude that the jury's fears were ex-
aggerated or that its proposed solutions are unwise. But the de-
bate which reports, such as the one before us, would provoke could
lead only to a better understanding of public governmental prob-
lems. They should be encouraged and not prohibited. 42
The Irwin Court
The court also relied quite heavily on a 1933 court of appeal
case, Irwin v. Murphy,43 as precedential authority. Irwin indicates
just how emphatically the California courts have endorsed grand jury
reports.
41. CAL. PEN. CODE § 917 (West 1970). The court also cited as authority id.
§ 923 which provides: "Whenever the Attorney General considers the public interest
requires, he may, with or without the concurrence of the district attorney, direct the
grand jury to convene for the investigation and consideration of such matters of a
criminal nature as he desires to submit to it. He may take full charge of the presenta-
tion of such matters to the grand jury, issue subpoenas, prepare indictments, and do
all other things incident thereto to the same extent as the district attorney may do."
42. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34 citing The California Grand
Jury, supra note 19, at 123. It is difficult to understand how the court decided that
"similar crimes" would be prevented by the suspension of indicted students and
faculty. This position might be logical if the persons the grand jury recommended be
suspended, had been convicted of the type of crimes sought to be prevented. But, even
though logical, such a position would still seem improper, since an "indictment is a
mere accusation, and raises no presumption of guilt." Coyne v. United States, 246
F. 120, 121 (1917).
Thus, by stating that the recommendation by the grand jury was aimed at pre-
venting similar crimes, the court impliedly approved the notion that these particular
defendants would be likely to commit "similar crimes"-an assumption based solely
on the fact that they had been indicted for such similar crimes. Such an assumption
is clearly illogical, and appears contrary to the presumption of innocence normally
accorded the accused.
43. 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933).
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On September 26, 1930, the San Francisco grand jury published a
report of its findings in connection with the death of a prize fighter
in a local bout.4" No indictments were returned against any of the
principles involved because of insufficient evidence. Nevertheless, the
report received sensational front-page publicity,45 and recommended
that the governor request the resignation of the state boxing commis-
sioner.46 The report also recommended that the state athletic commis-
sion "permanently and perpetually" revoke the license of the referee
who officiated the fight, 7 and continued:
The referee . . . by a preponderance of the evidence, is guilty
in our eyes of carelessness and inefficiency, deliberate or other-
wise, on the night in question, and his sworn testimony is at vari-
ance with all other sworn testimony heard.
48
Unquestionably, the grand jury had both the right and the duty to
make an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of
the fighter-a possible criminal homicide-since grand jurors bind
themselves by their oath to inquire into all "public offenses" committed
or triable within their county.49 The plaintiff in Irwin, however, chal-
lenged the right of the grand jury to issue the public report in the ab-
sence of any criminal indictments and sued for libel and slander, nam-
ing the jury foreman as principal defendant. The court held that the
grand jurors were privileged in issuing the report and continued:
Law and common sense combine to compel the conclusion that, if
a grand jury is authorized and bounden [sic] to inquire of public
offense, a necessary element of this power must be the power and
duty to disclose the result of the inquiry.
. . . What an inane and lifeless body a grand jury would be
if the limit of its power in case no indictment were returned were
complete silence or a formal report of two words-"charge
ignored." 50
44. The bout took place between Max Baer and Frankie Campbell on August 25,
1930. The latter died the following day as a result of injuries sustained in the fight.
45. The newspaper accounts of this episode provide a lively and insightful back-
ground to the case. The grand jury's report was carried on the front page of the morn-
ing Chronicle under an eight-column banner headline: "JURORS URGE TRAUNG,
IRWIN OUSTERS". San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 27, 1930, at 1. The subheadline
read: "Ring Game Clean? No! Says Jury". Id. at 1, col. 2.
46. Id. at 2, col. 4.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the Irwin court did not
reproduce this language-which shows the grand jurors saw themselves somewhat as a
guilt-finding body rather than as an investigative, accusatory body. Instead, the court
paraphrased these "accusations." 129 Cal. App. at 714-15, 19 P.2d at 292-93.
49. CAL. PEN. CODE § 911 (West 1970). See note 59 infra.
50. 129 Cal. App. at 717-18, 19 P.2d at 293-94. The court cited as authority
CAL. PEN. CODE § 915, now § 917 (West 1970) (see text accompanying note 41
supra), and CAL. PEN. CODE § 920, now § 939.7 (West 1970). Contra, In re United
Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). "It may be said that the Grand
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The court in Irwin may have overstated its case somewhat-sub-
stituting hyperbole for a sober recognition of the genuine dispute over
the propriety of such reports.5 However, the court in Monroe ap-
proved the holding in Irwin with only a slight qualification.
It must be pointed out that the wisdom of the [Los Angeles
County Grand Jury] report and press release is not before this
court. We are called on only to determine the legality of these
documents.
If it was not an excess of jurisdiction for the Grand Jury
in Irwin to suggest the revocation of the license of a referee and to
examine the rules and regulations of boxing contests and make rec-
ommendations, then we see no reason why it is an excess of juris-
diction to recommend the suspension of teachers or students and
recommend changes in the educational opportunities program.
52
The Distinction Between Monroe and Irwin
The court in Monroe, by deliberately refraining from ruling on the
"wisdom" of the report and press release, bypassed an opportunity to
note the basic distinction between the two cases. In Irwin, even though
there was doubt as to the propriety of certain accusations made in the
report and the grand jury's right to make them, no criminal indictments
were ever returned against those implicated in the report. In Monroe,
however, when the grand jury issued its report, criminal charges
were pending against certain individuals involved in activities directly
criticized by the report. Such a distinction should be made and indeed
deserves judicial consideration. In Monroe the recommendation of the
grand jury that students and faculty facing criminal charges be sus-
pended until resolution of such charges, might have adversely influ-
enced the objectivity of a prospective juror in the subsequent criminal
Jury's function is to determine whether there is enough evidence before it to support
the charge of crime. . . . If there is, the Grand Jury returns an indictment; if there
is not, it remains silent. Once having determined that the evidence is insufficient, its
function ends. It may not then issue a report based upon information derived during
the course of its secret inquiry, directed to the executive and legislative branches, which
touches upon matters within their exclusive authority." Id. at 864-65.
51. One immediate challenge to the grand jury's "shot-gun" criticism of local
boxing was issued, appropriately enough, from the Chronicle's sports section. The re-
port had accused "particular" sports writers of conspiring with boxing clubs "with
the object of increasing box office receipts through the publicity so obtained." San
Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 27, 1930, at 1, col. 2. Under a headline, "Grand Jury Must
Give Facts When It Presents Serious Accusation", the Chronicle sports page delivered
the following counter-punch: "The Grand Jury, if it wishes to be fair, must give the
names of such newspapermen as are charged with having too friendly a connection
with boxing clubs. It is unjust to all others who handle such sports that they should
be placed under blanket suspicion." Id. Sept. 28, 1930, Sporting Green at 1, cols. 6-7.
52. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 283-84, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
February 19721 GRAND JURY REPORTS
trial. To be sure, a certain amount of publicity directed at prominent
figures in campus disorders may be unavoidable, but this factor would
appear to further militate against a grand jury issuing a report which di-
rects more publicity at a defendant facing criminal charges.
The Nature of the Controversy
Before considering in more detail the possible conflict between a
pretrial grand jury report and the right to fair trial, it may be helpful
to note briefly some of the objections often raised regarding the types
of grand jury reports under consideration. The conclusion "compelled"
by the union of law and common sense is not invariably that reached by
the court in Irwin."3 Among the criticisms often listed against the is-
suance of grand jury reports, five stand out."
Extrajudicial punishment. Perhaps the most serious objection to
grand jury reports which censure individuals-by name or by imputa-
tion-without indicting them, is that they amount to extrajudicial pun-
ishment. Such reports cast a social stigma on the individual affected
without affording him a judicial hearing in which he can offer evidence
to refute the accusations. The greater the publicity, the greater the po-
tentially adverse effect on the individual. Courts and legal writers
have noted that the harm caused to the individual as the result of a vi-
tuperative grand jury report may be as socially detrimental as a crimi-
nal indictment. 55 Therefore, if there has been antisocial activity which
is not punishable under the penal law, the remedy should be through
legislative change of the penal law rather than through the issuance of
a grand jury report.56
Report accepted as reliable by public. Closely aligned with the
53. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
54. See generally Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 343-46 (N.D. Ohio
1971); In re United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 866-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); O'Regan
v. Schermerhorn, 25 N.J. Misc. 1, 26-31, 50 A.2d 10, 24-27 (Sup. Ct. 1946); In re
Wilcox, 153 Misc. 761, 764-74, 276 N.Y.S. 117, 121-32 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Kuh, supra
note 27, at 1115-22; Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries,
41 YALE L.J. 687, 704-11 (1932); Comment, The California Grand Jury, supra note
19, at 122-24. Comment, Constitutional Law-Judicial Powers-Legality of the Grand
Jury Report, 52 MICH. L. Rav. 711, 711-26 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Law].
55. A person's reputation may be severely injured by an indictment based on in-
sufficient evidence where no prosecution follows, yet "no one would suggest eliminat-
ing . . . the power of a grand jury to indict." In re Camden County Grand Jury,
10 N.J. 23, 63, 89 A.2d 416, 441 (1952).
56. Comment, The California Grand Jury, supra note 19, at 124. The legislative
change referred to is that of making the antisocial conduct a crime. An alternative
legislative change is that of specifically granting the grand jury power to report on
noncriminal conduct of, for example, public officials. See text accompanying notes
65-87 infra.
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social impact on a particular individual is the objection that the informa-
tion in the report is generally considered to be very reliable by the gen-
eral public. Since the average ctiizen may not clearly understand the
general function of the grand jury, the tendency may be to regard the
grand jury as an extension of the court.5- The inherent danger, of
course, is that the report achieves an air of officiality in the eyes of the
public which is not warranted, since the grand jury's members are
merely laymen, selected at random rather than for their specific in-
vestigative abilities or knowledge of the law.58
Secrecy. Grand jury proceedings are by statute clandestine. 59  As
a result, the accused in a grand jury report may often not know the real
basis for the accusations. 60  When the report is not issued in conjunc-
tion with an indictment, the accused in the report is denied the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; and unless he is
given the opportunity by the grand jury to appear and testify in his own
behalf, he may be denied the right to include any rebutting evidence in
the report itself. Thus, the grand jury's accusations are not subject to
the safeguards of an adversary proceeding. 61 Although the same criti-
57. In one sense the grand jury may properly be deemed an extension of the
court in that the "grand jury is not an adjunct of the office of district attorney but
is an independent body, members of which are officers of the court." In re Peart,
5 Cal. App. 2d 469, 473, 43 P.2d 333, 336 (1935). But such an impression is clearly
incorrect if it leads to the assumption that the grand jury findings are as well-
founded or persuasive as those of the court itself.
58. See, e.g., In re United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
59. CAL. PEN. CODE § 911 (West 1970) is typical of provisions in many states
requiring grand jurors to take an oath of secrecy. The substance of the oath has
changed remarkably little in nearly 300 years. In proceedings against the Earl of
Shaftesbury in 1681, the following oath was administered to grand jurors:
"You shall dilligently inquire and true presentments make of all such matters,
articles and things, as shall come to your own knowledge, touching this present serv-
ice; the king's counsel, your fellows' and your own, you shall keep secret; you shall
present no person for hatred or malice; neither shall you leave any one unpresented,
for fear, favor or affection, for lucre or for gain, or any hopes thereof; but in all
things you shall present the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to the
best of your knowledge. So help you God." THomPsON & MERRUAM, JUInEs 649-50
(1882). See CAL. PEN. CODE § 924.1 (West 1970); see also Kennedy & Briggs, supra
note 34, at 251-55. Comment, Constitutional Law, supra note 54, at 717-18.
60. CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.6 (West 1970) sets forth guidelines as to what consti-
tutes admissible evidence in grand jury proceedings. However, the secrecy of such
proceedings may at times prevent effective monitoring to assure that these guidelines
are followed.
Proceedings before a federal grand jury are also secret. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
See also Note, Powers of Federal Grand Juries, 4 STAN. L. REV. 68 (1951).
61. One early nonlegal writer has suggested that secrecy poses certain dangers
even where one is afforded the guarantees of an adversary proceeding: "The jury,
passing on the prisoner's life, May in the sworn twelve have a thief or two Guiltier
than him they try." Shakespeare, Measure For Measure, act. II, sc. I, line 1.
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cism may be made regarding excoriating grand jury reports issued in
conjunction with criminal indictments, the accused does have a chance
to clear his name at trial.
Unaccountability of grand jury. A fourth objection to grand jury
reports is the inherent potential for the grand jury to abuse its powers
because its members are selected rather than elected. As one writer has
pointed out,
Legislative investigations conducted in a patently unfair manner
are subject to correction through public dissatisfaction which can
be expressed at the polls. Political chastisement of a grand jury
which has acted unjustly is impossible.!
2
Imposition of jurors' personal "morality." An additional criticism
of grand jury reports has been that when the grand jury report censures
an individual without indicting him they are really imposing personal
standards of right and wrong instead of applying the highly defined
rules of the criminal law.6 3  The penal law offers objective guidelines
for the grand jury to use in determining whether an individual has
acted in a way society has determined shall be punishable. When the
grand jury censures behavior which does not represent an indictable
offense, those guidelines give way to the personal mores of the grand
jury and the danger of oppression increases.64 If the behavior criticized
by the grand jury report is generally felt to violate accepted norms, the
remedy should be the legislative enactment of criminal laws proscribing
such behavior rather than extrajudicial action by the grand jury.
Much of the dispute over grand jury reports could be obviated if a
distinction is made between grand jury reports involving public offi-
cials and private individuals;65 and also by developing procedural safe-
guards designed to protect individuals referred to in such reports
against possible abuses by the grand jury. The public has a right and
a need to know about undesirable conditions in the community, and
62. Constitutional Law, supra note 54, at 717-18. But see Kennedy & Briggs,
supra note 34, at 259.
63. "Crime is any social harm defined and made punishable by law." R. PER-
KINS, CRIMINAL LAW 9 (2d ed. 1969).
64. "Basic to our theory of justice is the principle that there can be no punish-
ment for harmful conduct unless it was so provided by some law in existence at the
time. This has found expression in the doctrine: Nulla poena sine lege-no punish-
ment without a law for it." Id. at 8.
65. CAL. PEN. CODE § 919(C) (West 1970) differentiates between public officials
and private individuals. "The grand jury shall inquire into:
(c) The willful or corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every de-
scription within the county." Logically this section should be interpreted to require
grand jury investigations of noncriminal conduct by public officials, since section 917
authorizes grand jury investigations of all "public offenses" committed or triable
within the county.
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when these facts can be brought to light without singling out individuals
for criticism, there would appear to be no real objection to grand jury
reports. As indicated, most courts will tolerate general reports of this
kind.68 But the disclosure of undesirable conditions by the grand jury
will of necessity often entail naming or implicating a particular individ-
ual. When the individual affected is a public official, a report on his
misconduct in office would be fully justifiable so long as he is afforded
certain fundamental protections against the possibility of an improper
grand jury report. Public servants, especially elected officials, occupy
positions of public trust, and as trustees of the public welfare these of-
ficials assume a risk that they will be the subject of close scrutiny and
public comment.
67
The New York Legislative Approach to
Grand Jury Reports
Recent New York legislation incorporates a distinction between
grand jury reports involving public officials and private individuals by
expressly allowing grand jury reports of noncriminal conduct of pub-
lic servants. 68  The statute reverses the position previously held in a
66. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
67. "It must be emphasized that one is concerned here with public office and
nonfeasance and neglect in such office. Current events hardly suggest that a public
officer is in dire need of protection from criticism. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ... and the cases in its wake, make
quite clear that, except for defamation made with 'actual malice', a public offender
will be denied a private tort remedy, however grievous the defamation. Surely
the risk of a private defamation with impunity is far greater than official defamation
which has always, in the public interest, been granted at least qualified privilege." In re
Second Report of the Nov., 1968 Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200, 216, 257 N.E.2d 859,
868, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297, 310 (1970) (Breitel, J., dissenting). Kuh, supra note 27, at
1122-24, advocates that all persons and business entities assuming public responsi-
bilities be accountable to the public in grand jury reports.
68. N.Y. CIUm. PRO. LAw § 190.85 (McKinney 1971) provides:
"1. The grand jury may submit to the court by which it was impaneled, a report:
(a) Concerning misconduct, non-feasance or neglect in public office by a public
servant as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action; or
(b) Stating that after investigation of a public servant it finds no misconduct,
non-feasance or neglect in office by him provided that such public servant has re-
quested the submission of such report; or
(c) Proposing recommendations for legislative, executive or administrative action
in the public interest based upon stated findings.
2. The court to which such report is submitted shall examine it and the minutes
of the grand jury and, except as otherwise provided in subdivision four, shall make an
order accepting and filing such report as a public record only if the court is satisfied
that it complies with the provisions of subdivision one and that:
(a) The report is based upon facts revealed in the course of an investigation
authorized by section 190.55 and is supported by the preponderance of the credible
and legally admissible evidence; and
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considerable body of New York case law that grand juries had no
power to report on noncriminal misconduct or neglect of public offi-
cials or other individuals. °9 The New York cases had previously held
that the statutory mandate for grand jurors to inquire into the willful
and corrupt misconduct in office of public officers"0 did not impliedly
authorize the issuance of any report where no criminal conduct was in-
volved. 71  The recent statute eliminates the need for finding implied
statutory authority to issue reports by specifically providing for grand
(b) When the report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision one,
that each person named therein was afforded an opportunity to testify before the
grand jury prior to the filing of such report, and when the report is submitted pursuant
to paragraph (b) or (c) of subdivision one, it is not critical of an identified or
identifiable person.
3. The order accepting a report pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision one,
and the report itself, must be sealed by the court and may not be filed as a public
record, or be subject to subpoena or otherwise be made public until at least thirty-one
days after a copy of the order and the report are served upon each public servant named
therein, or if an appeal is taken pursuant to section 190.90, until the affirmance of the
order accepting the report, or until reversal of the order sealing the report, or until
dismissal of the appeal of the named public servant by the appellate division, whichever
occurs later. Such public servant may file with the clerk of the court an answer to
such report, not later than twenty days after service of the order and report upon him.
Such an answer shall plainly and concisely state the facts and law constituting the
defense of the public servant to the charges in said report, and, except for those parts
of the answer which the court may determine to be scandalously or prejudicially and
unnecessarily inserted therein, shall become an appendix to the report. Upon the ex-
piration of the time set forth in this subdivision, the district attorney shall deliver a
true copy of such report, and the appendix if any, for appropriate action, to each pub-
lic servant or body having removal or disciplinary authority over each public servant
named therein.
4. Upon the submission of a report pursuant to subdivision one, if the court
finds that the filing of such report as a public record, may prejudice fair consideration
of a pending criminal matter, it must order such report sealed and such report may
not be subject to subpoena or public inspection during the pendency of such criminal
matter, except upon order of the court.
5. Whenever the court to which a report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (a)
of subdivision one is not satisfied that the report complies with the provisions of sub-
division two, it may direct that additional testimony be taken before the same grand
jury, or it must make an order sealing such report, and the report may not be filed as
a public record, or be subject to subpoena or otherwise be made public."
69. See, e.g., Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 173 N.E.2d 21, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1961). N.Y. CrIM. PRO. LAW § 190.85 (McKinney 1971), formerly N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PRO. § 253-a, was upheld as constitutional in In re Second Report of Nov., 1968
Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200, 257 N.E.2d 859, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1970).
70. Former N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 253(2) (McKinney 1958) was worded the
same as CAL. PEN. CODE § 919(C) (West 1970), quoted at note 65 supra. This
language is altered somewhat in the new codification. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §§ 190.05,
190.55 (McKinney 1971).
71. See Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 149-54, 173 N.E.2d at 23-26, 212 N.Y.S.2d
at 36-39 (1961).
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jury reports of official, noncriminal misconduct in office, subject, how-
ever, to certain carefully circumscribed limitations.
The statute provides that the report must concern a public servant,
and be issued for the purpose of recommending his removal or disci-
plinary action. 71  Further, the judge to whom the report is submitted
must file it as a public record only if the report results from an investi-
gation of crime73 or wilful and corrupt misconduct in office by the in-
dividual named in the report. 74  In addition, the statute provides the
one named in the report has the right to testify before the grand jury
before it issues the report, 75 and that the report shall not be made public
until at least thirty-one days after the individual named has received a
copy of the report.76 The public servant is also entitled to file an
answer to the report rebutting the grand jury's accusations, and such
answer then becomes an appendix to the report. 77  Additionally, the
court in its discretion may: (1) seal a report where it might prejudice
fair consideration of a pending criminal matter;78 (2) order that addi-
tional testimony be taken by the grand jury; or (3) order the report
permanently sealed if the grand jury fails to comply with any of the
procedural requirements listed in the statute.7
9
The New York statute thus appears to reconcile the public's right
to know of socially harmful conditions with the rights of the individual
to due process of law.80 The assumption can be made that as a general
matter society has a crucial interest in learning of noncriminal miscon-
duct in public office, and a properly supervised grand jury may serve
to effectively ferret out such information. 8' Much conduct which is
72. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 190.85(1)(a) (McKinney 1971).
73. Former N.Y. CODE CIUM. PRO. § 245 (McKinney 1958) was similar to
CAL. PEN. CODE § 917 (West 1970) quoted in text accompanying note 41 supra. The
new codification provides that the "grand jury may hear and examine evidence con-
cerning the alleged commission of any offense prosecutable in the courts of the county,
and concerning any misconduct, nonfeasance or neglect in public office by a public
servant, whether criminal or otherwise." N.Y. CUM. PRO. Aw § 190.55(1) (McKin-
ney 1971) (emphasis added); accord, id. § 190.05.
74. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw § 190.85(2)(a) (McKinney 1971).
75. Id. § 190.85(2)(b).
76. Id. § 190.85(3).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 190.85(4). See text accompanying notes 88-129 infra.
79. Id. § 190.85(5). Section 190.90 outlines procedures for appealing from or-
ders concerning grand jury reports.
80. See, e.g., In re Second Report of Nov., 1968 Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200, 204,
257 N.E.2d 859, 861, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (1970) holding the right of an individual
to file an answer to a report under N.Y. CODE Cait. PRO. § 253-a 3(b), now N.Y.
CRIM. PRO. LAw § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1971), includes the right of the accused to
examine the minutes of the grand jury proceedings in order to ascertain the identity of
witnesses against him and the evidence on which the report was predicated.
81. "Thus grand jury presentments [reports] of public affairs serve a need that is
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not subject to criminal penalties is nevertheless a legitimate matter of
public concern; for example, inefficient or corrupt city government, im-
properly administered police or fire departments, and the like. A
grand jury is particularly well suited to conduct these investigations
since it is generally immune to the political pressures which prod legis-
lative and executive investigatory committees and because grand jurors
are not, as a rule, trying to further political careers by reaching "popu-
lar" conclusions.8 2  In addition, the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,
though criticised by some as a potential instrument of oppression,"
may also serve a beneficial function by encouraging more complete dis-
closures by witnesses volunteering or subpoenaed to testify 8 4  Thus,
this "secrecy" factor may more than compensate for the lack of spe-
cial investigative ability on the part of the grand jury's members by
providing a forum more conducive to full disclosure of the truth than a
nonsecret, public forum. Objections to grand jury reports, such as the
danger that the grand jury will impose extrajudicial punishment based
on the jury's own notions of morality, can be effectively met by careful
fudicial supervision of the grand jury. When an individual is named in
the report and is not criminally indicted or when the grand jury indicts
an individual on insufficient evidence and no prosecution follows, his
reputation is unquestionably harmed and he is denied an opportunity
to clear his name in court; yet, the remedy to this problem would be
more careful supervision of the grand jury's indicting and reporting
functions.8 5
As indicated by Monroe and Irwin, there is a need for California
to re-evaluate its rather unrefined and permissive acceptance of grand
jury reports. The need for restricting the issuance of reports to only
those involving public officials is a critical one, as is the need to ensure
such procedural safeguards as the right of the accused to testify, to file
an answer, to examine the condemning evidence, and to know the wit-
not met by any other procedure. The grand jury provides a readily available group of
representative citizens of the county empowered, as occasion may demand, to voice the
conscience of the community. There are many official acts and omissions that fall
short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public interest. It is very much
to the public advantage that such conduct is revealed in an effective, official way.
No community desires to live a hairbreadth above the criminal level, which might well
be the case if there were no official organ of public protest. Such presentments
[reports] are a great deterrent to official wrongdoing. By exposing wrongdoing, more-
over, such presentments [reports] inspire public confidence in the capacity of the body
politic to purge itself of untoward conditions." In re Camden County Grand Jury,
10 N.J. 23, 66, 89 A.2d 416, 443-44 (1952).
82. See Kuh, supra note 27, at 1117-20.
83. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
84. See 53 OPs. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 200, 202 (1970).




nesses who testified against him. Such procedural safeguards may
somewhat burden the grand jury's reporting function, but any such
burden would be fully justifiable if we are to recognize basic fairness
and the rights of the individual accused.86 This re-evaluation of the
proper reporting function of grand juries should not be left to the
courts, but instead should be made by the legislature. The New York
statute, which has been referred to, would serve as a useful model .87
Report v. Fair Trial
California may refuse to limit the scope of grand jury reports by
enacting legislation similar to that in New York. Indeed, such a re-
fusal would be consistent with the position taken in Irwin8s and Monroe 9
-neither of which would seem to conform to the New York statute.
In addition to the fact that in neither case were the individuals afforded
the procedural protections required by the New York statute, the re-
ports did not involve public servants. The fight referee in Irwin was
perhaps in the public eye more than the average individual, but this by
no means would have made him a public servant under the New York
statute. Similarly, the students and faculty members referred to by
the grand jury report in Monroe could not, even in a Pickwickian sense,
have been considered public officials.
Should California fail to adopt legislation similar to that in New
York and continue to permit grand juries a broad reporting power,
some provision for suppressing a potentially prejudicial report when an
individual named therein is on trial becomes of significant importance.
The possibility of pretrial prejudice to a criminal defendant should be
a sufficient ground for delaying publication of the report. In recent
years the United States Supreme Court increasingly has attempted to
86. In a concurring opinion in In re Presentment by Camden County Grand
Jury, 34 N.J. 378, 405, 169 A.2d 469, 479 (1961), Chief Justice Weintraub stated that
if such burdens could not be borne, the individual's reputation must take precedence.
"Ijt may be said that, if there is no feasible solution, we should in such matters join
the jurisdictions which hold that a grand jury should indict or be silent." Id.
87. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970) includes a
number of provisions similar, and in some instances, identical, to those found in N.Y.
CRim. PRo. LAW § 190.85 (McKinney 1971). However, the federal legislation differs
from the New York statute in several particulars; for example, the federal statute
does not limit the type of evidence on which the grand jury may base its report. 18
U.S.C. § 3333(b)(1) (1970). The New York statute requires that the report be
supported "by a preponderance of the credible and legally admissible evidence. .. "
N.Y. ClUm. PRo. LAw § 190.85(2) (a) (McKinney 1971). For a disapproving view of
the federal statute see H.R. REP. No. 1549, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 182-84 (1970). See
also Note, Powers of Federal Grand Juries, 4 STAN. L. Ray. 68, 76-78 (1951).
88. 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933).
89. 17 Cal. App. 3d 280, 94 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1971).
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protect a criminal defendant against harmful publicity, both before and
during the trial.90 Also, recent state and federal legislation dealing with
grand jury reports specifically provides for delay in publication where
fair consideration of a pending criminal matter would be prejudiced.9
The California courts have already allowed the suppression of grand
jury transcripts during the pendency of criminal proceedings in order
to prevent possible adverse pretrial publicity,9 2 and similar considera-
tions would indicate the propriety of temporarily restraining publication
of grand jury reports. By temporarily restraining publication of po-
tentially prejudicial pretrial reports, the courts would help minimize the
number of motions for change of venue and appeals on the basis that a
fair and impartial trial could not be obtained because of prejudicial
pretrial publicity.
9 3
The United States Supreme Court signaled an increasing judicial
sensitivity to prejudicial publicity in Estes v. Texas94 and Sheppard v.
Maxwell.9  In Estes a two-day preliminary hearing of Billie Sol Estes
on swindling charges had been continually disrupted by the presence of
personnel and equipment providing live television coverage of the pro-
ceedings. Although the Texas court did not permit live televising of
the trial itself, portions of the trial were filmed and later shown on
videotape. The Supreme Court held that the television coverage allowed
by the state involved "such a probability that prejudice [would] result
that [it was] deemed inherently lacking in due process."9 " Although the
Court's chief concern in Estes was the effect of extensixe television cov-
erage on the right to fair trial, the principle announced can clearly be
applied to other adverse pretrial publicity. In holding that certain pro-
cedures are "inherently" lacking in due process, the Court in Estes
eliminated the requirement, in such a case, of showing actual, identifi-
able prejudice.9 7
90. See text accompanying notes 94-102 infra.
91. See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
92. Craemer v. Superior Ct., 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 225-27, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193,
201-02 (1968); accord, 53 OPs. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 200 (1970).
93. See Maine v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 375, 383-84, 438 P.2d 372, 377-78,
66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729-30 (1968).
94. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
95. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
96. 381 U.S. at 542-43.
97. In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Warren noted the need to guard
against possible prejudice from pretrial publicity "despite the observance of the formal
requisites of a legal trial." Id. at 561. "No doubt each juror was sincere when he
said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact
requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father." Id., quoting
Clark, J., in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961); see United States v. Cimini,
427 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1970).
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In Sheppard v. MaxwelP the Court reversed the 1954 murder
conviction of Dr. Samuel Sheppard for the second-degree murder of his
wife, holding that the voluminous and often partisan newspaper cover-
age before and during trial denied the defendant a fair trial. The ma-
jority opinion of Justice Clark makes clear the Court's position that it is
the duty of the lower courts to carefully monitor potentially harmful
publicity and, when necessary, to take steps to eliminate it.
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impar-
tial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of
modem communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial
publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take
strong measures to insure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its func-
tion.90
The publicity generated by the grand jury report and press release
in a case such as Monroe v. Garrett may not be as offensive or exten-
sive as that in Estes and Sheppard' so as to conclusively presume a
prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial. However, the
prejudicial effect may be said to be one of degree rather than kind, and
the principles announced by the Court in Estes and Sheppard appear to
encourage judicial intervention when mass publicity begins to tip the
scales away from the accused's right to fair trial. In balancing these
interests, the courts must determine, for example, the necessity for
making the report public before the accused has been tried. Sel-
dom, if ever, would the public interest served in the immediate disclo-
sure of the findings of the report outweigh the possibility of prejudice
to a criminal defendant. Further, the public interest might be served
just as effectively by a general report which did not mention any par-
ticular individuals, as by a specific report which publicly rebukes iden-
tifiable individuals. 1' 1 The Supreme Court has indicated that the con-
98. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
99. Id. at 362-63.
100. The publicity that surrounded the Sheppard trial, for example, was as abusive
as it was constant. A "Roman-holiday" atmosphere prevailed before and during trial.
The mass media instinctively sensed that the case-a murder mystery replete with
sex and suspense-was a "natural" for grabbing the public's interest. Editorials call-
ing for action against Sheppard, cartoons and banner headlines filled the press for weeks.
A typical editorial was captioned, "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect?", and re-
ferring to Sheppard, included the following: "Now proved under oath to be a liar, still
free to go about his business, shielded by his family, protected by a smart lawyer who
has made monkeys out of the police and authorities, carrying a gun part of the time,
left free to do whatever he pleases .. " Id. at 341.
101. See N.Y. CXuM. PRo. LAw § 190.85(2)(b) (McKinney 1971), which pro-
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flict between the public's right to know and the individual's right to
fair trial is best resolved by the application of a rule of fairness; and
the Court has left little doubt regarding the overriding importance of
the right to fair trial by stating: "We have always held that the at-
mosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most funda-
mental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs.
10 2
Precedent at the State and Federal Levels
The New York statute previously discussed1"' and other recent
federal legislation... allow the suppression of potentially prejudicial
grand jury reports. The pertinent section of the New York statute,
later adopted verbatim in the federal legislation, provides as follows:
Upon the submission of a report pursuant to subdivision one, if the
court finds that the filing of such a report as a public record, may
prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, it must
order such report sealed and such report may not be subject to
subpoena or public inspection during the pendency of such crimi-
nal matter, except upon order of the court.105
The clear purpose of this section is to give additional protection
against prejudice to criminal defendants under those circumstances
when grand jury reports are allowed to be published.106 The California
legislature should adopt a similar provision since California grand juries
have far greater autonomy in their reporting function than do the New
York or federal grand juries. The broad language of the Irwin case,
now nearly forty years old, is an unsatisfactory definition of the grand
jury's reporting function, and the redefinition of that function is prop-
erly a subject for the legislature. Until appropriate legislation is
drafted, the courts should carefully supervise the circumstances under
which grand jury reports are issued, and when necessary to avoid preju-
dice to a criminal defendant, a court should suppress otherwise proper
reports.
The standards set out by the Supreme Court in Estes'0 7 and Max-
eli' 08 were followed by the California court in Craemer v. Superior
Court.'09 The court of appeal affirmed the right of a trial judge to
vides that the court may order the report filed as public record only if it is not
critical of an identified or identifiable person.
102. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
103. See text accompanying notes 65-87 supra.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970).
105. N.Y. GRIM. PRO. LAW § 190.85(4) (McKinney 1971). The federal equiva-
lent of this section is identical except that it spells "subpoena" as subpena. 18
U.S.C. § 3333(d) (1970).
106. See 2 U.S.C. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4016 (1970).
107. 381 U.S. 532 (1964).
108. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
109. 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
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suppress publication of grand jury transcripts after indictments had
been returned. 10 The trial judge, in receiving the indictments against
sixteen named defendants, ordered the grand jury transcripts sealed,
and also specifically ordered that newspapers not be furnished copies,
in order to prevent pretrial publicity by the press. On appeal, while
holding that any permanent denial of public access to the transcripts
would be unreasonable, the court of appeal expressly acknowledged
the right of a trial court to temporarily withhold from public scrutiny
matters ordinarily of public record and stated:
In the light of Estes and Sheppard . ..it is clear that a judge
has the duty to protect a defendant from inherently prejudicial
publicity. Accordingly, it follows that in the performance of that
duty a judge may require the removal from public scrutiny of a
public record containing data or material which, if publicized prior
to trial, could result in publicity so inherently prejudicial as to en-
danger a fair trial. In the instant case it is clear that [the lower
court's] order was not based upon evidence establishing a reason-
able likelihood that inherently prejudicial publicity will saturate
the community and thus endanger defendants' right to a fair trial,
but that it is predicated upon an awareness of the probability that
prejudice to defendants will result."1
Though the decision in Craemer concerns a grand jury transcript
rather than a report, the court's language would appear sufficiently
broad to encompass a situation such as that suggested by the facts in
Monroe v. Garrett. As stated by the Craemer court, "Judicial ex-
perience has shown that pretrial publication of grand jury proceedings
has had a tendency, in some instances, to prejudice a defendant's right
to a fair trial.""' 2
Estes, Sheppard, and Craemer should not be interpreted as limit-
ing First Amendment rights, or as any attempt by the courts to regulate
the mass media and others not within the jurisdiction of the court. Rath-
er, the cases represent an increasing judicial awareness of a problem
which has grown as quickly as the ability to propagate information and
"news." While the "watchdog" role of the press and other mass media
110. Generally a transcript becomes a matter of public record after there has been
an indictment returned and the accused is taken into custody. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 938.1 (West 1970). If the grand jury does not return an indictment, the testimony
before it is not reduced to transcript form and grand jurors are bound by their oath
of secrecy not to divulge any of the substance of the proceedings. Id. § 924.1 makes
it a misdemeanor to willfully disclose any evidence adduced before the grand jury.
See also 53 Ops. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 200 (1970).
111. 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 225, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201 (1968) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 226, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 201. "Accordingly, we think that in keeping
with a trial judge's duty to insure that a defendant will receive a fair trial the judge
may, in order to prevent even the probability of unfairness, make such orders as are
reasonably designed to avert improper prejudice to indicted defendants." Id.
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has been properly acknowledged by the courts,' 13 there is a growing
recognition by the courts of a duty to a defendant-to exercise discreet
and limited control over persons and property under the court's juris-
diction as a means of insuring a fair trial. 114
There is yet another, fundamentally pragmatic, reason for sup-
pressing grand jury reports while criminal proceedings are pending or
in progress. By monitoring with greater thoroughness the issuance of
pretrial reports, courts would also correspondingly reduce the necessity
for appeals or motions for change of venue which might be based on
an alleged denial of fair trial due to prejudicial pretrial publicity. 115
Neither the right to appeal" 6 nor a motion for change of venue, how-
ever, would appear to be a proper substitute for careful judicial super-
vision of pretrial publicity. In the case of the grand jury report the
court would have the power to control at least one source of potentially
prejudicial publicity, and if the court fails to exercise this power, there
is an increased possibility that the defendant will seek a change of venue
before trial, or would subsequently have grounds for appeal from an
adverse judgment. In either case, judicial action taken to obviate
such a possibility, would promote more efficient administration of jus-
tice.
A Recent Review of the Problem
The possibility of pretrial prejudice resulting from a grand jury
report was recently considered by a federal district court in Ohio in
Hammond v. Brown.117  In Hammond a special state grand jury" 8
was called to investigate incidents at Kent State University during May
1-4, 1970, in which national guard troops killed four students and
wounded nine others. The grand jury returned indictments against
numerous individuals on a variety of charges, including arson and incit-
ing to riot."' In addition, the grand jury issued a report in which it
charged that certain faculty members and the university administration
113. E.g., Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1955), where Justice Terrell,
speaking for the Florida Supreme Court, stated: "There is no greater deterrent to
evil, incompetent and corrupt government than publicity."
114. See, e.g., 265 Cal. App. 2d at 224, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
115. See Maine v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 375, 383-84, 438 P.2d 372, 377-78,
66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729-30 (1968).
116. The right to appeal is not a sufficient guarantee of the right to fair trial since
"the burden, expense and delay involved in a trial render an appeal from an eventual
judgment an inadequate remedy." Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 562,
212 P.2d 878, 880 (1949).
117. 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
118. The proceedings of a special grand jury are "of the same force and effect"
as a regular grand jury. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2939.17 (Page Supp. 1970).
119. Thirty true bills covering 25 defendants and 43 offenses were returned by
the grand jury. 323 F. Supp. at 336.
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as a whole should share the responsibility for the "tragic consequences
of May 4, 1970."12° The report went on to find that the disturbances
during the four tumultuous days constituted a riot, and that the burning
of the campus ROTC building constituted arson. 12 ' The plaintiffs-
primarily faculty and students who had been indicted or referred to in
the report-moved to have the report expunged from the public record
alleging that the report was beyond the grand jury's scope of authority
and that it had prejudiced the plaintiffs' right to fair trial. The federal
court, applying the state law of Ohio,122 condemned the grand jury for
rendering moral and social judgments on policies, attitudes and conduct
of university personnel, and held that the report was improper and or-
dered it expunged from the public record.' 23  The court then consid-
ered the plaintiffs' allegations that the release of the report and the call-
ing of a court-authorized press conference 21 to discuss the grand jury
findings, had increased pretrial publicity, thereby adversely affecting
the right to fair trial of those persons indicted by the grand jury. The
court refrained from applying the "Sheppard principle" that the "prob-
ability of prejudice of jurors may be conclusively presumed under
certain circumstances and need not be proved."' 25 However, the court
noted that even though the report and press conference were not deemed
prejudicial per se, this did not exclude the possibility that they could be
shown to be prejudicial in fact. The court found it unnecessary to de-
cide the case on this basis, however, and held that the report was be-
yond the scope of the grand jury's express statutory powers and was
120. Id. at 347.
121. Id. at 340.
122. Federal subject matter jurisdiction was based on the plaintiffs' claim of
denial of the constitutional right to fair trial. The court exercised pendent jurisdiction
to hear the state claim that the Ohio special grand jury report was illegal and invalid.
323 F. Supp. at 343.
123. In judging the report improper, the court refused to find any implied statutory
authority for the grand jury to issue a report. The court noted that there were only
two provisions in the Ohio Code which authorized reports: § 2939.21 requiring an
annual inspection by the grand jury of the county jail and a report to be made to the
court of common pleas; and § 2939.23 requiring a report to the court when an indict-
ment is not found by the grand jury against an accused who has been held to answer.
323 F. Supp. at 343-44. Orno Rnv. CODE ANN. (Page 1954). CAL. PEN. CODE §
919(a), (b) (West 1970) consolidates these provisions but does not expressly provide
for a report of the grand jury's findings.
The Hammond court did not discuss ORio Rv. CODE ANN. § 2939.08 (Page
1954), apparently satisfied that it did not apply. This provision is the equivalent to
CAL. PEN. CODE § 917 (West 1970) on which the California courts in Irwin v.
Murphy and Monroe v. Garrett found the implicit authority for the grand jury reports
involved in those cases.
124. 323 F. Supp. at 356. The court states that one hundred reporters attended
the press conference.
125. Id. at 355.
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therefore improper. The court also ordered the grand jury report ex-
punged from the public record.
It is concluded and declared that the Report's continued
existence in court files and in the court's journal irreparably in-
jures the right of each of the accused indicted to a fair trial, pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.
1 26
The court thus clearly recognized that the "continued official exist-
ence' 1 27 of the report would infringe upon the right to fair trial, and
ordered the defendant to have published in the local press for six con-
secutive days a copy of the court's order together with a certificate of
the defendant's compliance with that order. 121 It seems evident, there-
fore, that the court considered the report prejudicial, in spite of the
finding of insufficient actual prejudice. Furthermore, the court was
of the opinion that whatever prejudice had been caused by the report
before its expungement might very well subside by the time of trial, and
one step toward eliminating any accrued prejudice would be the ex-
pungement of the report itself.' 29
Conclusion
Despite the absence of clear statutory authority, California courts
seem willing to approve grand jury reports with little or no hesitation,
even where a report publicly pillories a nonindicted, private individual.
Because of this permissive policy it is incumbent upon the California
courts to supervise more closely the circumstances under which such
reports are issued. Ideally, legislation should be enacted redefining the
permissible limits of grand jury reports, and such legislation would do
well to follow the New York model 3 ° which permits reports on non-
criminal misconduct of public servants so long as certain procedural
safeguards are maintained.
In the absence of such legislation, the California courts should at
the very minimum provide for delayed publication of a report where
126. Id. at 343. The court also considered the effect of the press conference on
the trial of the accused, and concluded that the press conference had not appreciably
increased pretrial publicity. "Once Judges Jones and Caris determined to release the
Report [to the press], one can be sure that alert newsmen would have given it full
coverage and distribution, even if the Report had been released in some other way
than a press conference." Id. at 356 (emphasis added). Thus, this ruling merely con-
sidered the additional effect of the press conference alter the decision to release the
report had been made. The ruling clearly did not indicate the courts condonation of
the press conference, but was addressed only to the issue of whether the press con-
ference had increased the total publicity given to the report.
127. Id. at 356.
128. Id. at 358.
129. Id. at 354.
130. See text accompanying note 68-79 supra.
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it might adversely affect the rights of a criminal defendant. When a
report reflects upon an individual who has been indicted, a court receiv-
ing the report should not allow its immediate release if it might im-
pinge upon that "most fundamental of all freedoms"-the right to fair
trial.131  Similarly, the court should scrutinize very carefully any at-
tempts by the grand jury to issue press releases or to call press confer-
ences for purposes of discussing the grand jury's findings. In most
cases a delay in publication would not adversely affect any public in-
terest served by such a report. For example, in Monroe v. Garrett,"2
the grand jury could easily have recommended to the court or district
attorney that the local operation of the Economic Opportunities Pro-
gram be investigated, without immediately making the same recom-
mendation in a press release. Similarly, the public recommendation
for suspension of indicted students and faculty would not appear to be
proper while their trials were pending, if such a recommendation can
be deemed proper at all.'33
In the final analysis, the same courts which sanction grand jury
reports owe a duty to guard against their abuse. To ignore abridge-
ments by a grand jury of fundamental considerations of fairness to the
individual, is to ignore subversion of the very judicial processes the
grand jury is designed to support.
Clement Glynn*
131. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
132. 17 Cal. App. 3d 280, 94 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1971).
133. As indicated above, this seems to be an improper recommendation for a
grand jury to make, publicly or otherwise. See note 42 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class
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